Current Research

– Legislative Urgency in Latin America

In Latin America, seven presidents wield the constitutional power to impose a short deadline on legislators to discuss and vote selected bills. However, urgency authority has received diminished attention among other presidential prerogatives. How does the urgency prerogative affect bargaining over legislation that takes place between the branches? Why, how frequently, and under what conditions do Presidents use urgency authority? Where the prerogative is apparently inconsequential (i.e., where not meeting its deadlines carries no apparent consequences), why do presidents still use it? Given the procedural aspects attached to urgencies in Chile (Magar, Palanza and Sin, forthcoming), do other cases resemble this case?

 

  • “Presidential Urgency and the Legislative Process”with Carmen Le Foulon

 

– To Vote or to Protest: Dignity vs. Legitimacy in Current Latin American Democracies, with Lucía Miranda & Federica Sánchez

This project seeks to shed light on how two related problems in Latin American politics are associated: growing electoral disaffection in several countries on one hand, and exacerbated mobilization that threatens the very stability of democracy, on the other. Our underlying concern is related to democratic legitimacy and the very prospects for democracy in the region. Our project delves into the common backdrop to both problems, and proposes that such backdrop is strongly shaped by specific institutional arrangements: majoritarian electoral rules along with a number of second order institutions that depoliticized citizens, often aggravated by barely compulsory or entirely non-compulsory voting.